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Abstract— This paper evaluates regulatory uncertainty and 
inefficiency that may prevent merchant transmission investors 
from committing in Europe, in particular when they are 
dominant generators. We argue that market players may perceive 
regulatory uncertainty to acquire exemption on merchant line 
mainly because of the discretion given for the application of Art. 7 
of the Regulation 1228/2003 on cross-border exchanges. However 
we show that an emerging strategy of the European Commission 
for granting exemption on merchant transmission line can be 
eventually derived from recent legal and regulatory proceedings. 
It mainly consists in relying on TSOs to build merchant lines. We 
demonstrate that this strategy is neither a first best nor a second 
best given imperfect unbundling and the current flows in the 
allocation of regulatory powers. Indeed, it prevents merchant line 
investment by dominant generators with low generation cost 
while they have currently more incentive than TSOs to build 
merchant lines. Since unregulated merchant transmission 
investment by generators would be problematic, we show 
eventually that the current strategy of the application of 
Regulation can easily be fine-tuned to reach this second-best 
optimum. 
 
 
Index Terms—Regulatory uncertainty, merchant line, 
exemptions, long term contract 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HE development of the transmission network is 
insufficient in Europe (DGComp, 2007). For the moment, 
restructuring has not succeeded in building a regulatory 
framework to incentivize the required increase in 
interconnection capacity through investments. Regulated 
investments face the national tropism of regulators and the 
conflict of interest of some integrated companies. And 
merchant investments to upgrade interconnections may also 
have difficulties in developing, while some generators with 
low costs has incentives to build merchant lines to export their 
power in areas with higher generation cost. This paper 
evaluates regulatory uncertainty and inefficiency that may 
prevent merchant transmission investors from committing in 
Europe, in particular when they are generators, and more 
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especially dominant ones.  
A transmission network with optimal capacity is essential to 
support at least cost well-functioning competitive and reliable 
wholesale and retail markets for electricity. The transmission 
network allows generators and consumers to trade power 
(Brunekreeft et al., 2005). It can expand the geographical 
expanse of competition among power suppliers and thus give 
consumers access to lower cost energy. By expanding 
competition over wider geographic areas the transmission 
network can increase the effective number of competitors and 
reduce market power and thus prices. A well functioning 
network facilitates the transmission of power from areas with 
concentrated and cheap resources of energy being for instance 
nuclear, wind or even coal to match demand and supply 
efficiently at different network locations to achieve economic 
and reliability goals (Joskow, 2006b). 
In Europe, regulated and merchant transmission investments 
were considered to develop interconnection. In theory, 
unbundled independent and well regulated TSOs that 
coordinate such that network users feel they face a unique TSO 
over the interconnected network are the best organization of 
power transmission activity (Costello, 2001; Pollitt 2007). For 
the moment, such organization has not been achieved all over 
Europe. Interconnection capacity is then insufficient and limits 
cross-border exchanges that remain the main sources of 
competition between incumbents in Europe.  
With EU Regulation 1228/2003 on cross-border exchange,3 
relying on merchant transmission investment was thought to be 
a solution for the development of interconnection. It gives the 
possibilities for third parties to invest in transmission. With 
merchant transmission investment, private investors are invited 
to construct electricity transmission lines in return for the 
rights to the revenue created by the spot price differential 
across the line. These market prices would therefore signal the 
need for and provide the revenue to finance that investment. 
Art. 7 of the Regulation allows new interconnectors to be 
exempted from regulated third party access, under rather 
stringent conditions, at least on paper. Vandezande et al. 
(2007) have noticed that these criteria are not very accurate. 
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Then they can let a lot of discretion to the energy regulators 
and the European Commission in their application, which 
fosters regulatory uncertainty. 
For an efficient investment in transmission network, legal 
and regulatory rules should be characterized by the two 
following features, whatever investment is regulated or 
merchant. First these rules should be steady or at least 
predictable. Indeed transmission line is a long term irreversible 
investment with a lifespan of at least fifteen to twenty years. A 
transmission owner is paid for the whole lifespan of its lines. 
He must then know with sufficient certainty the rules that 
apply for its remuneration to commit investment for such a 
long time. Otherwise uncertainty will prevent investment 
(Carruth et al., 2000)  
The second feature that legal and regulatory rules must 
fulfill to lead to an optimal transmission investment is indeed 
the search for efficiency. Of course, the behavior of investor 
participates to the efficiency of investment and its operation. 
But the legal and regulatory framework is fundamental for 
such a widely regulated activity because it sets incentives on 
the investor such that its profit maximization approaches the 
social welfare maximization (Joskow, 2006a, b). If there is an 
institutional difficulty in implementing regulation that leads to 
the first best optimum (or respectively to the second best 
optimum), the law and regulation should then be built to reach 
the second best optimum (respectively the third best optimum, 
etc.).  
In the case considered here, the investments by the TSOs 
are not sufficient to develop interconnection capacity. 
Regulation should then permit all possible options for welfare-
increasing merchant lines. As of today, we notice that a tenth 
of exemptions have been treated in Europe for gas investment, 
whatever pipelines or LNG terminals, and only two in 
electricity. And all the exemptions were granted, generally 
with minor modification (Van der Vijver, 2008). This allows 
predicting a common regulation of exemption in gas. In 
electricity however, the lack of precedents and the subsidiarity 
that applies for the grant of exemption cast doubts on the way 
the exemption will be granted, which fostered regulatory 
uncertainty.  
One generally defends the idea that transmission must be 
unbundled from generation because generators had relatively 
poor incentives to interconnect their systems. Stronger 
interconnection will give some opportunities for competitors to 
enter the incumbent’s home market (Brunekreeft and Newbery, 
2006). This is true for a generator whose costs are higher than 
the average. But a generator with lower cost than its neighbors 
clearly has an incentive to develop transmission to some extent 
to go and compete with generator with higher costs. Even 
more, Sauma and Oren (2007) show that a net exporting 
producer has the incentives to fund and support social-welfare-
improving transmission investments4. For instance, generators 
with a lot of nuclear and wind power capacity may want to 
develop interconnectors with the surrounding areas. 
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 This is conclusion can also be extended to the gas industry. 
It is not sure that the European regulatory framework 
authorizes generators to build merchant lines. Uncertainty is 
especially strong for generators dominant in their home 
markets on their legal rights whether to develop and own a 
merchant line or to acquire a long term contract to access the 
line through an open season, especially with regards to the 
particular harsh antitrust treatment they currently face on their 
long term supply contracts (see EoN Rurhgas,5 Distrigas6 and 
now EDF-Electrabel7 and GDF who are all under attack for 
these contracts). 
Litterature has dealt with different theoretical questions 
surrounding merchant line. Following the seminal Hogan’s 
(1992, 2002) idea of financial transmission rights8, Bushnell 
and Stoft (1996) suggest a transmission rights allocation rule 
based on the concept of feasible dispatch. Under this 
allocation rule, a transmission investor can select any set of 
transmission rights if and only if the set of existing 
transmission rights and these new ones corresponds to a 
feasible dispatch on the newly modified grid. They prove that 
such a rule can reduce or, under ideal circumstances, eliminate 
the incentives for a detrimental grid expansion while 
rewarding efficient investments.  
The Bushnell and Stoft’s paper has however the drawback 
to use implicitly stringent assumptions about the cost structure 
of transmission. They assume that transmission line has no 
economies of scale and no lumpiness. Taking into account 
these characteristics, Perez-Arriaga et al. (1995) and Joskow 
and Tirole (2005) show that merchant transmission investment 
would result in suboptimal transmission capacity.  
Joskow and Tirole (2000) also show that this conclusion is 
even worsened if a net importing producer is allowed to own 
transmission rights (by buying some to a merchant line 
investor) as it gives a supplementary tool to exert market 
power. Nevertheless, as we already said, Sauma and Oren 
(2007) show that a net exporting generator owning 
transmission rights has an incentive to support socially 
efficient transmission investment. Other saying, a net 
exporting producer has a clear incentive to build transmission 
as it allows him to increase his market share and profit.  
The paper is grounded on this idea of generators building 
power transmission lines on their own. We explore the 
regulatory uncertainty and inefficiency that surround such 
projects in Europe.  
Some papers have more specifically dealt with the merchant 
transmission lines in the European regulatory framework9. But 
these questions have never been extensively discussed. De 
Jong et al. (2006) raise only financial and regulatory issues but 
keep most questions opened. Vandezande et al. (2007) make 
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an analysis of the criteria for exemption through the study of 
Estlink and conclude on the need to precise the Regulation. 
Brunekreeft (2004, 2005a) analyzes regulatory issues 
concerning merchant lines, respectively the effect of merchant 
lines on competition, the ownership questions and access 
regimes. He concludes that merchant lines may not raise 
competition problem in Europe although it is not clear what 
the relevant market that must be considered for the study of 
exemption is. As for ownership questions, he asks whether 
there should be any restrictions for generators. As for access 
regimes, he globally argues that general competition law may 
suffice for unduly restricting access.  
This paper explores the uncertainty and the efficiency of the 
emerging strategy of the European Commission regarding 
exemption for power transmission lines. We argue that 
regulatory uncertainty may be perceived by market players 
mainly because of the discretion given for the application of 
Art. 7 of the Regulation 1228/2003 on cross-border exchanges. 
Brunekreeft has pointed out some of the questions that this 
discretion raises. Section II uncovers the mechanics of 
regulatory uncertainty for the granting of exemptions. Section 
III shows that a strategy of the European Commission for 
granting exemption on merchant transmission line is emerging 
and can eventually be derived from recent legal proceedings 
and regulatory evolutions. Section IV demonstrates why this 
emerging strategy is neither a first best nor a second best. And 
section V argues that the current strategy of the application of 
regulation can be fine-tuned to reach a second-best optimum.  
II. UNCERTAINTY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF MERCHANT 
LINES IN EUROPE 
Rules on exemptions have been subject to changes twice 
since the beginning of liberalization (1st Directive in 1996 and 
2nd Directive in 2003) and similar rules with a new allocation 
of regulatory powers are being prepared in the context of the 
third legislative package, which is currently under discussion 
at the European Parliament. As of today, two sorts of 
exemptions can be granted. First is the exemption of regulated 
third party access10, second is the exemption on the use of the 
collected congestion rent11. These exemptions mainly concern 
direct-current interconnectors but alternating-current 
interconnector may also be considered12. In theory, the 
exemption can only be granted if the conditions set out in Art 
7(1) of the Regulation are fulfilled. These conditions will be 
discussed below. The national regulatory authorities of the 
Member States directly involved have jurisdictions over the 
grant of the exemption. The merchant investor will thus have 
to fill applications before each national regulatory authority. 
Exemptions are to be examined on a case-by-case basis and 
conditions can be attached, for instance on the duration of the 
exemption. The Member States or the national regulatory 
authorities in charge must thus cooperate and find common 
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12
 Art 7(2) and (3) of Regulation 1228/2003. 
grounds for the grant of the exemption. In case of sustained 
disagreement between them, the Commission does not hold a 
final decision power and the project cannot proceed. However, 
the Commission retains the right to propose amendments or a 
complete withdrawal of the exemption. In case the Member 
States do not comply, the disagreement must be settled through 
comitology. Ex post, EC competition law may always apply in 
case of abuse of a dominant position or unlawfull concerted 
practices between the joint owners (Talus and Wälde, 2006) 
but antitrust powers have so far never been used on a merchant 
line. 
In the gas sector, the lack of consistency among decisions 
taken in different Member States (Van der Vijver, 2008) lead 
the Commission to publish an interpretatory note with a view 
to help both regulators to enforce the law and market players 
to anticipate it. This document shows the difficulties in 
streamlining a regulatory regime able to ensure both 
predictability and accuracy. The uncertainty created by the fast 
evolution of the sector-specific regulatory framework and 
antitrust enforcement is a paradigmatic feature of European 
energy markets (Cameron, 2007). The problem is arguably 
even stronger in the electricity sector where the lack of 
precedents contrasts with the dozen of decisions already taken 
in the gas sector. This regulatory uncertainty raises serious 
concerns in a sector where the predictability of regulation is 
crucial to stabilize market players’ expectations and hence 
allow them to sink high fixed-cost investments for 
transmission. Indeed, the cost of financing for merchant lines 
in electricity is typically much higher than in gas, except for 
the big international pipelines such as Nabucco. We depict in 
this section the two sources of regulatory uncertainty faced by 
market players at the present time. 
 
A. The methodology to examine applications for TPA 
exemptions 
The first source of uncertainty for merchant investors comes 
from the the methodology to examine applications for TPA 
exemptions itself. In practice, the exemptions can only be 
granted under the conditions listed in Article 7(1) of the 
Regulation. These conditions read as follows: 
“(a) the merchant interconnector should enhance 
competition in electricity supply; 
(b) the level of the risk is such that the investment would not 
take place unless the exemption is granted; 
(c) the interconnector must be owned by a person legally 
separate from the TSOs; 
(d) charges must be levied on users of the interconnector; 
(e) since the start of the European electricity liberalisation, 
no part of the capital or operating costs of the interconnector 
has been recovered from any component of the network 
tariffs; 
(f) the exemption is not to the detriment of competition or 
the effective functioning of the internal electricity market or 
the efficient functioning of the regulated systems to which the 
interconnector is linked.” 
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Originally, Art 7(1) was conceived as a test, which meant 
that each and every criteria had to be fulfilled. The regulatory 
practice in the gas sector has shown that it has not always been 
the case and that a balancing exercise is conducted in practice 
(Van der Vijver, 2008). Such a balancing exercise leaves a lot 
of discretion to the authority in charge and can be justified 
only if the benefits from tailoring regulation to specific cases 
offsets the inherent costs of discretion. The benefits of 
tailoring broadly depend on the level of information at hand, 
not only on the specific case but also on the competition 
dynamics of the sector, especially as regards the fact that a 
necessary condition is that the merchant line must enhance 
competition in electry supply. It also depends on the own 
agenda of the regulator (Cohen and Héritier, 2005). The 
detrimental effects of discretion on welfare are well know. 
They can broadly be sub-divided in three categories: 
regulation costs, rent-seeking and legal uncertainty 
(Christiansen and Kerber, 2006). The last problem, legal 
uncertainty, is augmented in the case of a decentralized 
regulatory framework. Ultimately, the right level of discretion 
is the one which minimizes both error costs of type I (false 
positive – allowing a merchant line detrimental to welfare) and 
type II (false negative – preventing a merchant lines positive 
for welfare) as well as limits the costs of regulation described 
above.  
The suitability and the clarity of the six conditions to be 
fulfilled for merchant investments in electricity do not appear 
able to allow for an efficient regulation of merchant lines in 
Europe. Conditions (c) to (e) do not raise specific problems of 
monitoring, except maybe for the standard of proof and they 
contribute to impose that the merchant investor takes the full 
commercial risk of its investment. In these respects, they 
appear to go in the right direction. However, criteria (a), (b) 
and (f) are much more problematic. First, criteria (a) and (f) 
tend to overlap. The fact that the merchant line should both 
enhance competition and not be detrimental to it leads to 
confusion. In gas, the parallel provisions lead national 
regulators to systemically favours criteria (f). This contradicts 
the spirit of the exemption test, very much embedded in 
condition (b), which was thought since inception to be a 
necessity test, namely that the exemption would be granted 
only if indispensible for the project to proceed (Van der 
Vijver, 2008). Turning to the applicability of condition (a), we 
cannot but notice that this criterion requires an excellent 
understanding of the competitive dynamics of electricity 
markets. This is a source of concerns for the future as the 
exemption process might consequently become very lengthy, 
and thus costly given the limited information at hand on 
competition dynamics in this sector. Overall, the competition 
effects will mainly depend on who is doing the merchant lines, 
under what conditions and with what opportunities to abuse its 
market power. It is far from clear who will be able to build a 
merchant line, especially as concerns the dominant generators. 
As a first approximation, this can essentially be done through 
customer foreclosure and abuse of market power on the spot in 
the destination market. A last argument concerns the ability of 
a merchant investor to prevent the development of a future 
regulated line (Knops and De Jong, 2007). It is however 
doubtful that the wording of Art 7(1) enables national 
competition authorities to minimize regulatory and error costs 
while ensuring a fair degree of predictability to market 
players.Criterion (f) is also problematic as the regulator might 
not have sufficient knowledge to assess the potential negative 
externalities on the network on both sides. Criterion (b) does 
not indicate how to assess the risk of that kind of project and 
even less how to use a sliding scale where the duration of the 
exemption would increase with the risk profile of the project. 
Knops and De Jong (2007) show the difficulties of such a task. 
In addition, no endogeneity of the exemption seems to be 
forecasted.  
Overall, for each of these 3 criteria, it is not clear which 
relevant facts must be taken into account to assess each criteria 
and how to combine them. If a balancing must be involved, 
this would be a highly tentative exercise as is well known in 
EC Competition law. Indeed, under Art 81 EC which tackles 
anti-competitive concerted practices, the anti-competitive 
aspects of contracts must be balanced with their potential 
efficiencies, which give rise to infinite theoretical and 
procedural problems. This is why the recent literature tries 
now to devise simple rules with a view to balance enforcability 
and predictability rather than trying to find optimal rules (e.g 
Evans and Padilla, 2005). We argue now that the lack of 
predictibility deriving from the drafting of the rules is 
multiplied by the flows in the allocation of regulatory powers.  
 
B. Flows in the allocation of regulatory powers 
The vagueness of Art 7(1) and the lack of methodology to 
interpret it are the first source of regulatory uncertainty. 
However, the lack of precision in the methodology could be 
mitigated by the presence of a single enforcer. This is however 
far to be the case as each national regulatory authority retains 
jurisdiction on its own national territory and cross-border 
infrastructure must be regulated by consensus between the 
regulators involved. For a cross-border infrastructure, the fact 
that companies must deal with as many regulators with their 
own agendas as there are countries involved increases 
substantially the regulatory burden on firms and thus the 
regulatory costs. The facts that the European Commission 
retains the right to require the regulators to amend their 
decisions within two months only partially limits the risk of 
inconsistencies as the European Commission has so far only 
very scarcely used that right and that right is not final. The two 
main sources of uncertainties with the current allocation of 
regulatory powers is the risk of inconsistent application of the 
rules laid down in Art 7(1) and the risk that the agendas of 
national regulators interfere with the objectives of the law. 
The practice of exemptions in the gas sector has 
demonstrated these problems. First, national regulatory 
authorities have tended to be very lenient with the granting of 
exemption. In fact, all exemptions have been granted with very 
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long durations, except in Gate for which the exemption was 
limited from 25 to 20 years. Some commentators have been 
speeking about a ‘regulatory competition’ and its inherent risk 
of ’race to the bottom’ which means that regulators would 
grant the TPA exemption with too lenient conditions to avoid 
having the project relocate in a competing country (Van der 
Vijver, 2008). Ofgem even states in Dragon LNG that it is 
trying to establish “the most favourable regulatory scheme”. 
We will show in Section IV that the incentive scheme of 
regulators will be different in electricity but that they will also 
constitute a barrier to the development of merchant 
interconnectors.  
Second, the level of precision of the methodology as well as 
the interpretation of criterion substantially diverged among 
countries. The drafting of the law and the conditions chosen 
opened the door to such outcome. The UK, having more 
experience, seems to follow the most structured analysis and 
publishes lenghty decisions. It also takes very wide relevant 
markets. Decisions released by national regulatory authorities 
also demonstrate a general lack of transparancy as most 
criteria are not analyzed openly and no public document 
clearly spells out the approach undertaken.  
However, if exemptions have all been granted, it does not 
mean that conditions have not been imposed. A toolbox of 
remedies can indeed be depicted which suggests that the 
necessary regulatory tools are in place. Among the most 
important, diverse national regulatory authorities such as 
Ofgem and AEEG have imposed an absance of TPA 
exemption on reverse flows, use-it-or-lose-it principles and 
regulatory monitoring at schedules dates. The Commission 
seems to follow that approach as evidenced in Grain. 
To conclude, the regulation of TPA exemptions does not 
avoid the usual pitfalls of competition policy in deregulated 
european energy markets which lies in the lack of 
predictability of regulation and an ‘announced’ case-by-case 
approach which does not seem to deliver efficiency through 
tailored solutions. This is all the more detrimental to market 
players in view of the fast evolutions of both the sector-
specific legal framework and the market environment in 
general. This is thus in fine detrimental to final consumers in a 
sector where the ability to commit in the long-term is crucial to 
ensure a socially beneficial level of investment. With regard to 
the structural under-investment in network capacity which the 
European Union is facing (DG Comp, 2007), the legal 
uncertainty currently perceived in the market place becomes a 
major issue. In gas, we have seen that the risk of type I error is 
stronger. However, we will argue in the next two sections that 
this is the risk of type II errors which will predominate in 
electricity. 
 
III. THE EMERGING EUROPEAN COMMISSION STRATEGY FOR 
THE REGULATION OF MERCHANT LINES 
The main uncertainty concerns the assessment of 
competition effect of a merchant line on electricity supply by 
each national regulator. This uncertainty thus mainly concerns 
the beneficiary of a merchant line according to its market 
position. In this section, we expose what is the emerging 
European commission strategy on that issue. We claim that it 
can be derived from historical facts and the Commission 
policy in the context of the third legislative package. 
 
A- DG Comp strategy is clearly emerging from historical facts 
The European Commission is well aware of the crucial 
importance of the development of cross-border interconnectors 
for competition and security of supply. As a result, the 
Commission is not suspicious over merchant lines per se, but 
over who the promoter of the line and then the owner of the 
priority right will be. A web of indices drawn from recent 
historical facts makes us think that the Commission will 
systemically favor and encourage merchant lines by new 
entrants and TSOs and will systematically reject applications 
by suppliers who hold a dominant position (typically more 
than 40% market shares). TSOs will be allowed to use open 
seasons as we saw in gas but a remaining uncertainty concerns 
the rights of dominant operators to participate in these open 
seasons. The three following points converge towards that 
regulatory position.  
First, in the gas sector, exemptions have only concerned 
non-dominant players. The Italian regulator, EEG, even 
repeatedly stated that dominant firms will not in principle 
benefit from an exemption.  
Second, for already existing and amortized interconnectors 
owned by dominant firms, the Commission and the European 
Court of Justice have been particularly harsh with dominant 
operators. They indeed systemically deemed long-term 
capacity reservations signed before liberalization to be abuse 
of a dominant position and required that 100% of capacities be 
freed up (UK-French submarine interconnector,13 Dutch-
German interconnector,14 and Norway-Denmark and Denmark-
Germany interconnectors following the merger VEBA/VIAG15). 
The antitrust tolerance towards risky infrastructure investment 
seems now impossible to justify for existing amortized 
infrastructure. Foreclosure effects of new long-term 
reservations on existing capacity, which will hardly ever be 
directly linked with new investment in that infrastructure, 
cannot be counter-balanced by arguments related to the need 
for investment (DG Comp, 2007). The same applies to current 
prolongation of historical contracts beyond their originally 
foreseen end date when this possibility was foreseen in the 
historic transport contract.  
Third, the strategy of the EU Commission regarding long-
term supply contracts is clearly emerging and departs from the 
pre and early post-liberalization period. It demonstrates the 
 
13
  UK/France Interconnector, informal settlement, IP/01/341 of 12.03.2001. 
14
  Case C-17/03 Vereniging voor Energie, Milieu en Water, Amsterdam 
Power Exchange Spotmarket BV, Eneco NV v Directeur van de Dienst 
uitvoering en toezicht energie [2005] ECR I-4983. See Commission Staff 
Working Paper on the decision C-17/03 of 7 June 2005 of the Court of Justice 
of the European Communities, SEC (2006) 547, 26 April 2006. 
15
  Case M.1673 VEBA/VIAG. 
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tightening of antitrust enforcement towards dominant firms 
while giving them some leeway when clear efficiencies are 
involved. After Distrigas and EoN Rurhgas, EDF, GDF and 
Electrabel are currently under attack on this issue mainly 
because of the risks of market foreclosure. Prior to the first 
liberalization directive, enforcement of competition law did 
not occur on a regular basis and there were only few instances 
of long term contracts. Most of them concerned independent 
power producer supplying the national incumbent on an 
exclusive basis. Following the Single European Act, the 
directive on cross-border trade in electricity16 was enacted in 
1990 and the Commission started to look at these long term 
supply contracts to limit their duration so that they would not 
hamper the future opening of markets to competition. The 
durations were in general limited to 15 years as in 
Electricidade de Portugal/Pego,17 Isab Energy/Enel,18 
Sarlux,19 Rosen,20 REN/Turbogas,21 Scottish Nuclear22 or Api 
Energia23 and 25 years in Transgas/Turbogas24. Since the 
early 2000’s, and most surely since the last 3 years in decisions 
such as EoN Ruhrgas and Distrigas, a new methodology to 
analyze long-term supply contracts in the new market building 
context of energy markets has emerged. This methodology 
primarily relies on market shares thresholds (De Hauteclocque, 
2008). The baseline is that if contracting parties’ individual 
market shares do not exceed 30% and do not include clauses 
with market partitioning effects, the long term supply contract 
will be exempted from further scrutiny. Over 30% and 
especially over 40% which is the dominance threshold in EC 
Competition law, the European Commission will conduct a 
balancing of potential anti-competitive aspects with efficiency-
enhancing aspects. In practice, the Commission will be strict 
on the following points: the duration must not be over 5 years 
(reduced to 2 years if the dominant firm supplies more than 
80% of its customer global demand), 70% of its portfolio of 
customers must come back to the market every year and 
clauses amounting to a use restrictions are prohibited. As a 
result, the duration of contracts implemented by dominant 
companies is severely limited. 
The discussions around the third legislative package and 
especially the ‘third way’ for network unbundling that some 
Member States have succeeded to impose should not soften 
that suspicion. Indeed, a group of Member States lead by 
 
16
  Directive 90/547/EEC on the transit of electricity through transmission 
grids [1990] OJ L147/37. 
17
  Electricidade de Portugal/Pego Project, Notice pursuant to Art 19(3) of 
Regulation 17/62 [1993] OJ C265/3 and 23rd Report on Competition Policy at 
222. 
18
  Isab Energy, Notice pursuant to Art 19(3) of Regulation 17/62 [1996] OJ 
C 138/3. 
19
  Competition Report 1996 at 134. 
20
  Competition Report 1996 at 134. 
21
  REN/Turbogas, Notice pursuant to Art 19(3) of Regulation 17/62 [1996] 
OJ C 118/7. 
22
  See Section IV for more on this case. 
23
  Competition Report 1996 at 134. 
24
  See 26th Report on Competition Policy, at 135. The 25 years duration was 
justified by an improvement of security of supply due to the development of 
alternative sources of gas supply. 
France and Germany refused the proposition of the 
Commission to impose either full ownership unbundling of the 
grid or the outsourcing of the grid operation to an independent 
system operator and managed to include a ‘third way’ where 
the present provisions on legal and accounting unbundling are 
simply a little bit deepened. The difficulties around the 
enactment of the third legislative package show once again that 
the on-going opposition of several major Member States and 
the resulting gaps in the sector-specific regulatory framework 
continue to hinder the completion of a single European market 
for energy. In this context, the European Commission uses all 
its antitrust powers to constrain incumbents’ behaviors as 
evidenced by the decision of E.ON to divest its transmission 
network to avoid further antitrust scrutiny25. As a result and 
given the previous points, it is most likely that the intended 
outcome under condition (a) of Art 7(1) is to exclude dominant 
firms from the benefit of the exemption. The current strategy 
of the Commission in the context of the third package also 
tends to confirm this trend.  
 
B. The Current Strategy of the EU Commission in the context 
of the Third Package confirms this trend 
Two items constitute the main pillars of the strategy of the 
European Commission for the development of cross-border 
networks in the EU electricity market. The first is the policy 
regarding unbundling. The second is the creation of the 
Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER 
thereafter). Unbundling not only aims to ensure a non-
discriminatory access to the network, it also aims at providing 
the right incentives for the TSO to invest. The Commission 
thinks that the TSO must be freed of any influence from the 
vertically integrated dominant company and that the network 
will be developed optimally if that condition is fulfilled. In 
case of the most risky projects, they will be able to get an 
exemption as in Britned.  
To facilitate a consensual approach to the regulation of 
interconnection, merchant one in particular, the ACER is to 
create an institutionalized forum where decisions will be more 
easily taken. Combined with what we saw in Britned, namely 
an exemption concerning the use of the congestion rent (Van 
der Vijver, 2008), we believe that the Commission seeks an 
increased development of the network through improved TSOs 
and not really through producers’ interconnector. In fact, the 
European Commission does not have anything against non-
dominant operators creating a merchant line. But such projects 
are so capital-intensive that, in most cases, a small player or a 
new entrant will not be able to carry out that project. In the 
Commission’s view, the development of the network will thus 
be based on independent TSOs, under TPA or not, and with or 
without open seasons. A remaining uncertainty does remain on 
the point of the right of incumbents to participate in open 
season.  
The Commission is thus seeking to implement a first best 
where TSOs will carry the full responsibility of the 
 
25
 See O.J. 2008, C 146/09 and MEMO/08/396 of 12.06.2006. 
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development of the network under the supervision of a unified 
regulator. We show in the next section why this strategy is 
misguided and so leads to only to a third best optimum. 
Section V then will propose a simple improvement of EU 
energy regulation on TPA exemption to restore the second best 
optimum where dominant generator is authorized to build and 
own merchant line. 
IV. THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION STRATEGY ONLY AS A THIRD 
BEST OPTIMUM 
This section shows that not only the European 
Commission‘s strategy for developing interconnection is 
suboptimal but also that this strategy does not reach what we 
think is the second best where dominant generators should also 
be authorized to build merchant transmission lines, under some 
conditions, of course.  
Despite the imperfect unbundling approved by the third 
package, the current strategy of the European Commission 
relies only on the TSOs upgrading interconnection capacities 
even with merchant investments. Moreover this strategy still 
gives an important place to national regulators in the process 
of designing the characteristics of merchant lines. And the 
creation of a European regulator may change few things about 
the place of national regulators in the process.  
The first two sub-sections show that regulators and TSOs 
are likely to hamper the development of merchant lines in 
some conditions. Sub-section A presents why TSOs with 
imperfect unbundling have incentives not to study nor build 
merchant interconnection. Sub-section B gives reasons why 
regulators can also hamper the development of merchant 
interconnection. Sub-section C shows not only that some 
generators have more incentives to develop interconnection 
but also how they can then overcome the difficulties of 
interconnection development and increase interconnection 
capacity in Europe.  
A. TSOs hampering merchant interconnection 
The main reason for opening transmission investment to 
profit-motivated merchant investors is that this may go some 
way to addressing the perceived problem of under-investment 
in transmission in Europe. Ownership unbundling is not 
mandatory and regulation imposed on TSOs is relatively weak 
in Europe. Therefore, vertically integrated utilities, owning 
both generation and transmission assets remain. And they had 
relatively poor incentives to interconnect their systems. 
Stronger interconnection will give some gains from trade, but 
increases competition in their respective generation markets 
and may reduce profits. If vertical separation of transmission 
from generation is not feasible, an alternative approach to this 
problem is to allow third parties to invest in transmission 
assets (Brunekreeft and Newbery, 2005).  
But we have seen in the previous section that European 
commission will still rely on the TSOs to develop merchant 
interconnection in spite of the conflict of interest with their 
mother generation companies. To compensate the potential 
conflict of interest that the TSOs subsidiaries of generation 
companies may face, a stricter regulation of TSOs will be 
implemented26. However, merchant transmission line is private 
business. Therefore, regulation will poorly give incentive for 
TSOs to build merchant lines. Building an interconnection can 
be seen as a kind of game with the two TSOs hence 
interconnected as two players. Each TSO has a veto right to 
refuse or prevent the building of interconnection. Until now, 
the interconnections whether regulated or not have always 
been built jointly by the two TSOs hence interconnected. We 
can assume that in the future interconnection in particular 
merchant one will still be built inside such a partnership.  
However, legally unbundled TSOs may not have the 
incentives to develop merchant interconnection yet, even in the 
case the generation mother company cannot directly intervene 
in the decision process of the transmission company. The 
objective of the mother company may still interact with the 
objective of the subsidiary transmission company. For 
instance, a TSO whose mother generation company has high 
generation cost may be reluctant to increase transmission 
capacity as it may permit cheaper generation to come and 
compete against the incumbent (Brunekreeft and Newbery, 
2005).  
A legally unbundled TSO can exert his veto right on the 
building of merchant interconnection in different ways. He can 
delay the study to justify building interconnection. He can 
argue with the other TSO about the sensitivity of the study for 
interconnection regarding assumptions. He can deliberately 
rely on the local oppositions to the building of interconnection 
to prevent effective construction.  
Even a fully unbundled TSO may not have the incentive to 
invest. But this time, it is not linked to the type of unbundling 
but to the agenda to the regulator. 
B. Regulators hampering merchant interconnection 
The third directive will initiate the creation of a European 
regulatory agency for electricity and gas, the ACER, Agency 
for Cooperation of the Energy Regulators. However, this 
agency is thought to have only limited power as it may only 
apply a sunshine regulation27. National regulators then keep 
their prerogatives. But national regulators have their own 
agendas that may remain stuck to national interests without a 
real willingness to expand and regionalise the electricity 
market (Glachant and Lévêque, 2005). They may then have no 
incentive to see interconnection capacity increase, as it runs 
counter their current agenda. Regulation at national level can 
hamper merchant transmission investment for two reasons.  
First, a new interconnector will as a rule decrease prices on 
the importing side, but increase prices on the exporting side. 
The losing side may then be tempted to block, to delay or not 
to incentivize the construction of the line although the line 
might be globally welfare enhancing (De Vries and Hakvoort, 
 
26
 http://www.euractiv.com/en/energy/compromise-sight-energy-
liberalisation/article-172415  
27
 See what Giulio Napolitano and Mario Savino, University of Tuscia 
have written the 26th November 2007 on the EU Energy Blog 
http://www.energypolicyblog.com/?p=91  
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2002). This may be amplified by the Regulation 1228/2003 
being not very clear. It is not straightforward whether 
competition used as a criterion of the Regulation should be 
measure at the level of a country or of a broader scope at the 
regional or European level when a merchant line is tested. A 
national regulator has then discretion to choose the level he 
will use to evaluate merchant lines. A priori, he will choose the 
smallest area, that is to say national or infra-national, to 
amplify artificially potential competition problems.  
The second reason is that national regulators can be 
reluctant to the building of a merchant line in parallel to 
existing regulated transmission roads. This is because such a 
merchant line will decrease the congestion rent perceived by 
the TSO from the regulated road. And this congestion rent is 
very precious to the regulator. It allows him to decrease 
obviously the access tariff and to exert ostentatiously its 
regulatory power. Lack of interconnection capacity may not be 
a problem for a regulator as no investment means no 
unpopular raise of the regulated tariff and increase in 
congestion rent (De Jong et al. 2007). NorNed that links the 
Netherlands with Norway is an example of such a situation. It 
was initially thought to have a 1200 MW capacity, which was 
the optimal capacity for the social point of view. However, the 
regulators (respectively DTe and NVE) and the TSOs 
(respectively Tennet and Statnett) chose a 600 MW capacity 
for the project to be commercially feasible but socially 
suboptimal (Bugten, 2004; Brunekreeft, 2005b).  
Finally, the TSOs whether they are fully unbundled or not 
may have little incentive to increase interconnection capacity, 
even with exemption. With the current dash for generation 
investment, some generators may have more incentive to 
develop interconnection on a merchant basis. The implicit 
strategy of the European commission will not allow to benefit 
from this opportunity to boost simultaneously transmission 
investment and competition.  
V. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE IN THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
STRATEGY TO REACH A SECOND BEST OPTIMUM  
 
We show in this section that the current suspicion against 
merchant lines by dominant generators is not legitimate as the 
efficiency for the individual market players meets the interest 
of the society much more than the European Commission tends 
to usually think. We then show that a specific regulation must 
be imposed to reap the benefits of merchant lines by these 
dominant players. 
A. Incentives for generators to commit in merchant lines 
Facing a structural under-investment in network capacity, 
we argue that the European Commission should stop aiming at 
a third best solution and uses the window of opening created 
by the current changes in cost conditions in energy markets. 
Two types of opportunities can motivate some generators to 
take long term commitment on transmission capacity in 
Europe, either through participation in open-seasons to access 
a merchant line or through direct building of a merchant line.  
First there may be classical opportunities of arbitrage 
between countries with different mix of generation 
technologies. The rebirth of nuclear in some countries only 
will give advantages for utilities while the cost for fossil fuels 
are still rising and renewable energies will not suffice to cover 
the need of power. By chronological orders, Finland, France, 
the United Kingdom and Italy have announced their 
willingness to allow construction of new nuclear power plants. 
Utilities with the nuclear advantage may then want to export it 
in other countries where they are implanted to compete against 
local incumbents that are more dependent on fossil fuels and 
renewables. Besides, since the national decisions of 
relaunching the atomic energy are not simultaneous, there may 
be even inter-temporal arbitrages between countries favourable 
to the nuclear power.  
Some generators may be willing to commit in a merchant 
line for a second reason. They may want to secure partly or 
thoroughly capital-intensive investments with long term 
contracts. We have seen in section III that for the moment, the 
European Commission generally does not want incumbents to 
secure their investments with long term contracts in their own 
countries. But it seems that the European Commission would 
be more accommodating with long term contracts when the 
counterparties are in another country (De Hauteclocque, 
2008). This strategy of contracting abroad however encounters 
a major obstacle. Such a long term contract of supply needs a 
long term access right to interconnection. Without long term 
access right to interconnection, the resulting uncertainty would 
be detrimental to capital-intensive generation investments. But 
the access rights to the interconnections in Europe are only 
available with a maximal duration of one year. This duration is 
of course incompatible with a long term contract of supply that 
can last until five years. Even if the TSOs proposed long term 
access rights, it is not sure that they would be allowed taking 
into account the decision in C-17/03 of the 7th june 2005 of the 
Court of Justice of the European Communities on long term 
access rights on the interconnections, even if the CFEC is 
probably more lenient than the EU Commission on that issue. 
Therefore, the only way for generators to have long term 
access to the interconnections is either to win an open season 
on a merchant line or to build its own merchant line.  
A generator building a merchant line should then be 
considered by the European Commission, all the more that it 
would increase the European social welfare compared to a 
situation where the European Commission would prevent it. 
B. Benefits from allowing generators to build merchant 
lines 
If the generators are authorized to build merchant lines in 
Europe, a second best optimum can be reached. Indeed, some 
transmission investments that increase the social surplus may 
then be made while they may not in the current European 
regulatory framework. This sub-section shows why these 
investments increase social welfare and how these investments 
make the social welfare increased.  
Merchant transmission investments realized by generators 
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can increase social welfare for two reasons. First the European 
Commission should not analyze the anti-competitive effects of 
long term access rights to a merchant line (either directly 
owned by a generator or acquired in an open season) as a long 
term contract of supply. The capacity of merchant transmission 
lines is generally similar to the capacity of a power plant. So it 
is small compared to the size of the national markets in 
Europe. Foreclosure on merchant lines will then have a small 
effect on the overall competition and so on the social welfare 
(Brunekreeft, 2005a).  
The second reason why merchant lines built by generators 
would be welfare increasing is that generators may have more 
information than TSOs on opportunities of arbitrage between 
national markets. TSOs are stuck to their national or regional 
boundaries while generators are increasingly present in a high 
number of national markets through mergers and acquisitions. 
They can then have a better knowledge of the evolution of the 
market conditions than the TSOs.  
The welfare-increasing effect of merchant lines built by 
generators can be translated in three ways. First Gans and King 
(2003, 2004) showed that an exempted network investment is 
realized sooner than a regulated one. This is because in an 
uncertain environment it is hard for a regulator to commit to 
the long term on the remuneration of risky investments. The 
network operator anticipates this lack of commitment from the 
regulator and delays its investment until it is less risky. There 
is no risk of regulatory hold-up with an exemption. By 
cancelling this delay, an exemption then increases the social 
welfare. 
Merchant lines built by generators have a second effect that 
makes the social surplus increased. We have already seen that 
the TSOs do not eventually have a lot of incentives to build 
merchant lines in the current regulatory framework whereas 
some generators can be more proactive in building merchant 
transmission interconnections and even upgrade the network 
up to the socially-efficient capacity (Sauma and Oren, 2007).  
Merchant lines built by generators have a last effect which 
can increase the social surplus. We have previously shown that 
generators can use merchant lines to transit a long term 
contract of supply outside their native area. With such long 
term contracts they can secure and build more capital-intensive 
generation technologies (Roques et al., 2006). With 
contractual arrangements and so less risk, the generation 
investors have better incentives to choose the optimal 
generation mix. While without long term contracts, the 
investors are incentivized to choose less risky investments 
even if they are more expensive. In addition, these long term 
contracts channelled through a merchant line would not 
contradict the current efforts of the Commission towards 
limiting customer foreclosure so long as the exporter is not 
dominant in the destination market as well. In case, the long 
term supply contracts would be with the producer’s own local 
distribution subsidiary, EC Competition law would not apply 
as it does not apply to intra-firm dealings. As a result, allowing 
merchant lines for the dominant generators able to invest in 
large scale investment technologies is a way to mitigate the 
potentially perverse effects of the current EC policy on long-
term supply contracts and customer foreclosure that may 
otherwise deter such needed base load investments. As in the 
field of innovation where policy tries to fine tune the interface 
of antitrust and IP law (Katz and Shelanski, 2006), we 
advocate here an increase in the integration of competition 
tools and an aggregate analysis of its effects to better leverage 
its own action. At last, we must note that merchant lines 
promoted by dominant firms retains the usual positive effects 
of any new increase in network capacities, especially on 
security of supply, competition for the development of the 
network and its efficiency-enhancing aspects, and ultimately 
on the political goal of a deeper integration of the European 
single market.  
 
C. The fine tuning of regulation and regulatory power 
allocation 
As shown in previous sections, we think that efficiency for 
individual market players and efficiency for society rejoin 
much more than competition authorities tend to think in the 
case of merchant lines developed by dominant producers. 
However, we do not argue in favor of a complete laissez-faire 
with no ex ante regulation or antitrust enforcement 
whatsoever. To the contrary, we think that regulation must be 
tailored to this specific case and that the required tools for this 
specific regulation are already in place. 
The key conditions for allowing dominant firms to sponsor 
merchant lines are to impose systematic use-it-or-lose-it 
(UIOLI) principles and no exemptions on the reverse flows. 
Indeed, a first objective must be to enforce an effective UIOLI 
regulation which would mitigate the potential retention of 
transmission capacity in case the generator owner of that line 
has always not the cheapest one in his native areas. The key 
regulatory target must be here to ensure transparency, which 
means in this context ensuring both a reliable and timely 
access to information for potential users on the available 
capacity at different time horizons and use efficient means to 
fight abuses of dominance. Enforcement is as important as the 
monitoring of transparency. In the context of an open season, 
we propose to rely on the current market share threshold used 
in antitrust analysis to ensure predictability. As a result, a 
capacity cap of 80% on the dominant firm could be 
implemented. As in VPP, the regulators could impose different 
durations (e.g. up to 3 years) for the remaining 20% so as to 
accommodate the smaller players’ needs. A UIOLI principle 
would still be imposed on the dominant operator after an open 
season. To analyze the very remote possibilities of customer 
foreclosure, the regulatory authorities in charge of the 
exemption should consider that the exemption will never be 
granted if the market shares of the supplier amount to more 
than 30% in the destination market. We mitigate that way the 
risk of abuse of market power for a firm vertically integrated 
across borders. 
The second condition is to refuse TPA exemptions on 
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reverse flows. The objective here is to force the dominant 
operator to bear the full commercial risk and optimize the 
benefit for the society in case price differentials reverse. This 
is also an efficient way to mitigate potential abuse of market 
power. In case of an association of collectively dominant 
producers in the same home market, this principle must also be 
enforced as opportunities for collusion are higher (Joskow-
Tirole, 2000). Last, if the joint owners of the capacity are 
generators dominant on both sides, the UIOLI principle will be 
the key condition to implement.  
A last pitfall remains concerning the Regulation. Indeed, the 
application of the sixth criterion of the EU Regulation 
1228/2003 is necessary since they prevent transmission 
investment with negative externalities. Indeed, transmission 
investment can potentially generate negative externalities and 
then be detrimental to the whole power system (Bushnell and 
Stoft, 1996). However, the application of this criterion is tricky 
as TSOs are the only ones to have expertise to measure 
negative effects of any transmission investments. Since this 
measure consists for the TSOs in evaluating competitors in 
transmission building, they may have obviously a conflict of 
interest (see the case of the merchant line Murraylink in 
Australia treated by Littlechild in 2003). The regulator and 
more precisely the ACER will then have to be careful about 
this sixth criterion, and asks for a complementary independent 
evaluation of these negative effects at the European level as a 
whole.  
To enforce these rules, the European Union should 
recognize the strength and weaknesses of the current allocation 
of its regulatory powers. It must indeed be emphasized that the 
potential difficulties of getting exemptions by two or more 
national regulators, with potentially different agendas, cannot 
be bypassed in the current context. ACER might improve the 
situation at the margin but the setting up of a true energy 
regulator seems remote. However, the current strength of the 
EU regulatory regime is the unified power of the European 
Commission to enforce the EC Treaty rules on competition, 
especially Art 81 EC, Art 82 EC and the Merger Regulation in 
our case. We also notice the important, though embryonic, 
development in EC competition law which is the on-going 
efforts to develop a “US style” sort of private enforcement as 
opposed to the public enforcement traditionally used in Europe 
(Georgiev, 2007). Indeed, private enforcement of antitrust 
rules by third parties is the dominant model in US antitrust. 
Under that enforcement regime, third parties attack themselves 
a concerted practice like a contract or an alleged abuse of a 
dominant position before the court or competition authorities. 
To the contrary in Europe, this is the competition authority 
which initiates the proceeding. The US model has obvious 
advantages as third parties often hold better information than 
competition authorities about market specificity and it also 
saves some of the scarce resources of competition authorities 
as it limits the needs for market monitoring. This is even truer 
in energy where the impacts of anti-competitive practices on 
competitive dynamics in a context of market building are much 
of a black box (De Hauteclocque, 2008).  
An efficient regulatory framework for merchant lines should 
be based on two pillars which would better take into account 
the respective strength of the different entities in charge of the 
regulation of European energy markets. The first pillar should 
be the ex ante monitoring of transparency requirements by the 
national regulators. The creation of ACER will facilitate the 
setting up of common standards and processes to better 
monitor the data provided by the dominant operator of a 
merchant line. The second pillar would be based on the 
antitrust powers of the European Commission to fight abuses 
of a dominant position on the basis of the ‘essential facility’ 
doctrine. Infringement of EC competition law would probably 
be qualified as a refusal to deal or excessive prices. To date, 
national competition authorities do not have jurisdiction on 
cross-border issues and their deterrence effect is also not as 
strong as the one of the Commission. The EC can indeed 
impose fines up to 10% of a company’s total revenues. 
Besides, its position has been much reinforced in the European 
regulatory landscape since the upheld of its decision by the 
ECJ in the Microsoft case. The disappointing results of the 
discussions on the third legislative package indeed tend to 
show that large-scale improvements of competition may for a 
while mostly be expected through EC antitrust enforcement 
and the bargaining power which the Commission leverages 
from the EC Treaty. In addition, the ‘essential facility’ 
doctrine is well enshrined in European law as has been shown 
in the recent Deutsch Telekom case.28 Contrary to the US 
where, following the Trinko case, antitrust authorities have 
seen their power to enforce third party access much limited to 
the profit of ex ante regulatory authorities, we can bypass the 
gaps of the European regulatory framework by relying on the 
European Commission antitrust powers. Allocating 
transparency monitoring to national regulators and ACER 
would also provide more reliable proofs to ground an 
infringement of EC competition law in case of a proceeding.  
Of course, all problems are not ruled out as the application 
of EC Competition law to energy interconnectors remains a 
new area with its grey zones (Talus and Wälde, 2006). The 
definition of the relevant market for instance might be 
problematic. However, following the definition of the relevant 
market in past case law, it seems that a merchant line should 
have to be considered as an independent market by itself (see 
the approach taken by the Commission for the UK-French 
submarine interconnector for instance). This would facilitate 
the assessment of dominance or collective dominance. Usually, 
the definition of the relevant market tends to be affected by 
differences in the regulatory framework29. To the extent that 
regulated and unregulated lines are not subject to the same 
regulatory framework, this tends to reinforce the fact that 
merchant lines would be assessed as a separate market. A 
related problem would be the choice of the Commission to 
 
28
 Case T-271/03, Deutsch Telecom v Commission, 10 April 2008, not yet 
published. 
29
 Case T-87/05, EDP v. Commission, 21 September 2005, not yet published. 
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proceed under Art 81 EC, Art 82 EC or the Merger Regulation 
in case of full-function joint-venture. The different case law, 
procedural standards and the uneven state of modernization of 
the different provisions on competition could appear to be a 
problem for legal certainty even if the modernization of Art 82 
EC is very much going forward (EAGC Report, 2005; DG 
Comp, 2005; Lowe, 2005).  
The strict imposition of UIOLI and no TPA exemption on 
reverse flows, coupled with a smart allocation of regulatory 
powers taking account of the legal constraints of national and 
European law, is to our mind the best way to go forward with 
the development of the network. This would have the 
advantage to limit the potential risk of type II errors and would 
limit regulation costs. Indeed, conditions (a) and (f) of Art 7(1) 
could in theory be removed, limiting the level of discretion 
which national regulatory authorities currently enjoy. This 
would increase both predictability and accuracy of regulation.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
A new model for the regulation of merchant lines in Europe 
should take into account the opportunities brought up by the 
changes in both the energy mix and the evolution of 
competition tools. Departing from a radical suspicion against 
former incumbents and an unrealistic search of the first best, 
the European Union should now clearly allow merchant lines 
by dominant generators and implement an enforcement regime 
based on a clear demarcation between transparency monitoring 
by national regulators with the help of ACER and antitrust 
enforcement by the European Commission. The second best 
that we propose would decrease the magnitude of error costs 
by national regulatory authority and by limiting the discretion 
of national regulators would limit regulation costs. Having a 
more integrated approach of competition policy to leverage the 
complementarities between the future ACER and the antitrust 
power of the European Commission is to our mind the best 
way to bring a new impetus to infrastructure investment in 
Europe. 
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